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A fundamental goal of government policy is to encourage economic growth. States use a variety of 
strategies to encourage economic growth, such as job training, education, and infrastructure development, as 
well as low taxes and light regulation. At the same time, policies intended to protect workers, promote 
equity, improve the environment, and achieve other goals are sometimes seen as discouraging economic 
growth if they require taxes or regulations that impose costs on businesses or reduce peoples’ incentives to 
work. These same taxes and regulations, though, might improve quality of life and make places more 
attractive to businesses and workers – ultimately even contributing to economic growth. The relationship, 
therefore, between any one policy and economic growth is complex.  
The complexity multiplies when we consider all of the policies states use to encourage economic 
growth and all of the policies designed to achieve other goals, but which may also affect economic growth. 
Considering policies together, however, is necessary, because policies often work in combination rather than 
in isolation. For instance, taxes that increase the cost of doing business may also finance investments in 
transportation infrastructure – another policy – that helps businesses. While it is a matter for the political 
process to determine the right balance between encouraging economic growth and other goals, a crucial 
research question essential to informing policy debate over balancing economic growth and other goals is 
how state taxes, regulations, and other policies affect economic growth. 
State business climate indexes summarize policies (and other factors) that might affect economic 
growth, and these indexes – published by many national organizations – often loom large in policy debate 
about economic growth. In this paper, we examine the relationships between a large set of state business 
climate indexes and state economic growth. We present detailed information on what the indexes capture, 
analyze whether they predict economic growth, and assess why particular indexes are or are not predictive of 
the economic outcomes we study, owing to the policies they capture or emphasize. We also broaden the 
analysis to consider other factors – such as weather
1 and geography – that may affect economic growth and 
which, if ignored, may obscure the true relationship between the policies captured by business climate 
                                                       
1 “Weather” means time-specific atmospheric conditions, and “climate” means long-term atmospheric tendencies. 
Because we use the term “business climate” repeatedly and also include long-term meteorological climate measures as 
controls, to avoid confusion we the word “weather” rather than “climate” to refer to meteorological climate measures.  
2 
 
indexes and economic growth.  
The analysis focuses on state business climate indexes rather than the individual policy components 
that constitute them, for two reasons. First, because the indexes play a large role in policy debate, it is useful 
to understand their predictive power. More important, though, the indexes represent attempts to reduce to a 
single measure a large number of policy variables that could affect economic growth. Because the number of 
important policy components is large relative to the number of data points, some method of data reduction is 
essential. However, existing research has demonstrated that the estimated effects of individual policies are 
quite sensitive to the other policy variables included in models of economic growth (or other outcomes), in 
part because of high correlations among policies. Thus, the results from a model with limited policy variables 
could reflect either the effects of the included policies or the effects of the omitted policies.
2  
At the same time, we are of course interested in the effects of the policies the indexes capture, rather 
than the indexes themselves. If we focused only on business climate indexes, we would not identify the 
effects of individual policies. We therefore also focus more narrowly on better-defined subsets of policies by 
examining the “sub-indexes” of several indexes; each sub-index covers a narrower range of policies like 
regulatory measures, corporate income tax structure, or welfare and income-transfer policies. This analysis 
can provide more specific guidance in identifying policy factors that influence economic growth.   
An important caveat should be noted at the outset. While we argue that there is merit in looking at 
bundles of policies via business climate indexes, this comes at a cost. In particular, some of the research 
strategies used to identify more rigorously the causal effects of a policy in studies focusing on a single policy 
are precluded. For example, it is difficult to think about how one would even propose an instrumental 
variable for a measure that aggregates many policies. And there is little variation over time, within states, in 
business climate indexes, ruling out state fixed-effects estimation. Nonetheless, we do what we can, given the 
constraints of the data, to assess and try to rule out non-causal interpretations of our findings. And we would 
argue that our evidence is at a minimum complementary to studies focusing on single policies, for which the 
                                                       
2 There are numerous examples of research focusing on a limited or more extensive set of specific policies. Studies of 
policies in isolation have focused on taxes (e.g., Bartik, 1991; Buss, 2001; Papke, 1991; Carlton, 1983) and regulation 
(e.g., Holmes, 1998); for reviews see Wasylenko (1997), Buss (2001), and Tannenwald (1997). Studies focusing on a 
fairly limited set of policies include Wasylenko and McGuire (1985), Bartik (1985), and Helms (1985). In contrast, 
Crain and Lee (1999) and Reed (2009) employ long lists of candidate variables to explain state economic growth, 
finding that the results are sensitive to model specification, but also identifying a subset of robust variables.   
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gain from more rigorous identification must be offset against the likely confounding of effects of multiple 
policies.
3 
Finally, factors affecting economic growth might vary at the local, regional, or state level. For 
example, within a state, metropolitan areas can have different patterns of economic growth, industrial 
composition, and workforce characteristics, as well as different local policies.
4 Despite the economic 
variation within states – especially large ones – we focus on business climate indexes and policy at the state 
level. Although state boundaries do not necessarily reflect labor or product markets or have any other 
inherent economic meaning, states set important economic policies, and the tendency of business climate 
indexes to rank states rather than metropolitan areas or other regions reflects the expected importance of 
taxes, regulations, investments, and other policies set at the state level. Also, even though metropolitan areas 
within states can have different industrial compositions and different economic growth patterns, economic 
growth rates for states overall clearly differ, with some states growing faster than others, often persistently. 
There is, therefore, plenty of variation in economic growth rates between states to explain, and many of the 
most likely policy factors that affect these economic growth rates are determined at the state level.  
2. POLICY DEBATE AND THE CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF STATE BUSINESS CLIMATE 
RANKINGS  
In policy debate, the question of how government policies affect economic growth is often couched 
in terms of the “business climate,” especially at the state level, and there is a cottage industry of state 
business climate indexes that fuels this debate. These business climate indexes figure prominently in policy 
debate, perhaps most commonly in arguments for lowering taxes and regulations in states that do poorly on 
indexes that emphasize these costs of doing business and taxes more generally. Conversely, states that do 
well on such indexes – because of low taxes, for example – often tout these indexes or rankings in trying to 
attract businesses (Kolko et al., 2011). Not surprisingly, politicians and other organizations use state rankings 
provided by business climate indexes to support their point of view. They are often able to do this selectively 
                                                       
3 Parent and LeSage (forthcoming) discuss a similar problem of an extensive list of possible influences – policy and 
other factors – in the context of explaining regional patterns of innovation.   
4 Indeed there are attempts to rank metro areas’ business climates, either using wage and rent premia, as in Gabriel and 
Rosenthal (2004) and Albouy (2009), or business climate rankings of metropolitan areas that parallel the state indexes 
(Beacon Hill Institute, 2007). However, emphasizing the point that policies are set more at the state level, the latter 
rankings rely heavily on state policy prevailing in the metropolitan area of interest.  
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because state business climate rankings can provide strongly divergent views of state policy environments. 
For example, some states that are ranked poorly in terms of taxes are ranked favorably on other dimensions, 
such as education and human capital, or quality of life measures including crime rates and health.
5     
Such conflicting information from state business climate indexes provides part of the motivation for 
this study. More generally, though, we study how state policy environments, as captured by state business 
climate indexes, predict state economic growth, both to inform our understanding of these indexes, and to 
help identify which policies are more important determinants of state economic growth. To do this, we 
collected data and detailed information on 11 well-known business climate indexes. We included indexes 
that have published rankings for multiple years and made their methods transparent, including providing a 
full list of the components that constitute the index. For several indexes, we also collected data and 
information on their sub-indexes, which we explain below.  
The first column of Table 1 lists the indexes included in our study and the institution that creates the 
index (as well as the years covered).
6 For reasons discussed later, we label these PROD1-PROD5, TXCST1-
TXCST5, and FISCPOL. The next two columns describe the focus of each index, and list the categories of 
policy variables covered by each index (out of 14 that we have created based on the content of the indexes). 
It is clear that the indexes aim to capture different facets of the policy environment. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if states are ranked differently depending on the business climate index, and if the indexes varied 
in the extent to which they predict economic growth. In addition, the institutions that create these indexes 
sometimes have specific agendas that may influence what policies they emphasize, which might or might not 
be the factors most predictive of economic growth.
7  
                                                       
5 To clarify the language we use below, a higher value of an index implies a better rating of the business climate – so 
that the ranking is closer to one.  
6 We also examined the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)-Laffer State Economic Competitiveness 
Index, the California Economic Performance Card, created by the California Foundation for Commerce and Education, 
and Best States for Business created by Forbes Magazine. However, the first is available only for 2008 and 2009, the 
second only for 2008, and the third only from 2006 through 2009, hardly overlapping our sample period. In addition, 
there is not sufficient detail available for Forbes’ Best States for Business, making it impossible to evaluate how the 
index was generated in terms of variables, sources, weights, and aggregation methods. 
7 For example, the Economic Freedom Index (TXCST4) is created by the Pacific Research Institute, whose mission is to 
“champion freedom, opportunity, and personal responsibility for all individuals by advancing free-market policy 
solutions.” (See http://liberty.pacificresearch.org/about/default.asp, viewed November 4, 2009). In contrast, the 
Corporation for Enterprise Development, which constructs three of the indexes we study (Table 1), describes itself as 
“[d]riven to create a more robust, fair and sustainable economy for all of us, … fueled by the belief that there is a  
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Table 2 shows how the 50 states rank on the business climate indexes. We first average each index’s 
ranking across the years for which the index is available. Then in the second and third columns we report the 
average of these averages for the first five indexes (PROD1-PROD5) and the next five (TXCST1-TXCST5); 
as we discuss later, these sets of indexes naturally group together. In the last two columns, we report the 
minimum and maximum for the state across average rankings of the different individual indexes. The table 
reveals that states’ positions in the rankings can vary wildly from one index to another. Indeed, the smallest 
difference between the minimum and maximum average ranking for states is 21, and for 16 states the range 
is 40 or higher. In fact, across all 50 states, every state but one (Hawaii) ranks in the top 20 in at least one 
index, and every state ranks in the bottom half in at least one index. Thus, based on these indexes, nearly 
every state could be praised for having a good business climate, or criticized for having a bad one.  
3. PAST RESEARCH ON BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES AND OTHER DETERMINANTS OF 
GROWTH  
Assessments of Business Climate Indexes
8 
Erickson (1987) reviews the development of business climate indexes in the United States, ascribing 
the beginning of modern business climate indexes to: the 1975 Fantus company index, prepared for the 
Illinois Manufacturers’ Association; the Alexander Grant & company (later, Grant Thornton) index, first 
prepared for the Conference of State Manufacturers’ Associations in 1979; and the Inc. magazine Report 
Card on the States, first published in 1981. Two early academic studies assess the relationship between these 
early indexes and economic outcomes (Plaut and Pluta, 1983; and Skoro, 1988). A later paper (Holmes, 
1998) suggested that the Fantus index captures an important pro- or anti-business stance of state policy. 
Including this index accounted for a positive relationship between right-to-work laws and manufacturing 
employment, also highlighting the problem that conclusions about a given state policy can be misleading 
without taking account of the many other state policies that can be reflected in a business climate index.   
A second and larger wave of business climate indexes – including many of the indexes we consider 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
tremendous amount of untapped potential in low-income people and distressed communities.” (See 
http://www.cfed.org/focus.m, viewed November 4, 2009). 
8 We focus on studies of business climate indexes and how well they predict state economic growth. There is a larger 
literature on state (and MSA) economic growth and convergence; a recent example is Bauer et al. (forthcoming).   
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in this paper – is assessed in more recent work. Fisher (2005) provides a sweeping critique of five business 
climate indexes. He is particularly critical of the “arbitrary” weighting of components in the construction of 
most indexes, in contrast to regression models that assign weights based on predictions of economic 
performance. Fisher also highlights the sensitivity of business climate indexes to specification and variable 
definition, criticizes the inclusion in indexes of variables that should be viewed as outcomes, and flags the 
potential for reverse causality with policy responding to growth rather than the other way around.  
There are problems with Fisher’s assessment of these business climate indexes, which we improve 
upon in a number of ways. First, he restricts tests of predictive power to simple correlations or regressions in 
which the only control other than the index is a lagged level of the dependent variable. Because many factors 
could be correlated with business climate indexes as well as economic performance, his tests are prone to 
omitted variable bias. Second, Fisher assesses indexes on their own terms – such as analyzing how well the 
tax-focused State Business Tax Climate index corresponds with other tax measures – rather than comparing 
the predictive power of multiple indexes for economic performance measures of interest, like growth in 
output, employment, or income. At the same time, we address some of the problems that he highlighted, 
including robustness of the evidence, the inclusion of outcomes in the indexes, and reverse causality.  
Bittlingmayer et al. (2005) use a more uniform framework that facilitates comparisons across 
indexes and attempts to control for other factors. Rather than including controls for other state-level variables 
that could affect economic growth, they study pairs of counties that straddle state borders, estimating 
relationships between the county ratios of business climate indexes and outcome growth rates. Their 
evidence is mixed, but it suggests that for some indexes a better business climate ranking predicts positive 
economic outcomes. Foreshadowing our results to some extent, they find that indexes more narrowly focused 
on tax policies are more likely to have positive relationships with growth than are broader measures, but also 
that the indexes with these positive relationships explain little of the variation in economic growth.  
This study also has potentially serious limitations. First, it uses a good deal of data on outcomes two 
to three decades prior to the business climate measures. Second, border areas can sometimes be poorly 
representative of entire states. Coastal states – where a disproportionate share of U.S. economic activity is 
located – tend to have their economic and population centers on the coast since oceans and lakes facilitate  
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trade and transportation. In states with smaller coastlines, like New York or Pennsylvania, economic centers 
might be both on the coast and near state borders; but in states with larger coastlines, like California and 
Florida, the vast majority of economic activity is far from state borders, and border areas of those states are 
economically distinct from the rest of the state. Third, economic activity in border areas is probably more 
sensitive to differences in state tax and regulatory policies since both sides of the border share similar 
economic conditions and may be in the same labor market. Thus, it is preferable to assess state business 
climate indexes using state-level data.  
Finally, Garrett and Rhine (2010) assess the relationship between state employment growth and the 
Economic Freedom Index of North America index and its sub-indexes. This index and its “size of 
government” sub-index has a positive and statistically significant (10-percent level) relationship with 
employment growth in the periods 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2005; the relationship for the “labor 
market freedom” sub-index is significant for the latter two periods and of larger magnitude than for the size 
of government sub-index. Similar to the approach we take, they regress growth rates on the initial values of 
the index, controlling for density, industry mix, and other factors. However, they consider only the one 
index, and in their analysis of sub-indexes they report only regressions on each separately, despite high 
positive correlations among the sub-indexes (documented later).   
Recent work on regional economic differences estimates the relative productivity of metropolitan 
areas, rather than states, using weighted averages of residuals from wage and rent equations, following the 
Roback (1982) model of spatial equilibrium (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2004; Albouy, 2009). This method does 
not require selecting or identifying factors that might enhance productivity, which offers the advantage of 
avoiding the arbitrary weighting schemes in business climate indexes, although of course it is more reliant on 
economic theory. Nonetheless, this approach parallels the use of business climate indexes, in that it studies a 
measure that aggregates across many policies to try to characterize the policy environment and economic 
conditions facing businesses in different areas. It does not distinguish, however, between policies and other 
factors that affect productivity. 
Factors Beyond Policy 
Factors beyond the immediate or even longer-term control of state and local policymakers likely  
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affect economic growth as well, and if we do not account for these factors, then estimated relationships 
between business climate indexes – and the policies underlying them – and economic outcomes can be 
misleading. For example, the local and regional growth literature emphasizes persistent – and sometimes 
quite immutable – characteristics like the local industry mix (Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson et al., 1995). In 
the short or medium term, policymakers probably can do little to change the industry composition of their 
region, even if investments in education or infrastructure might, over the long-term, help shift a local 
economy from one set of industries to another. This literature has also emphasized that mild weather and 
other amenities can contribute to local quality of life (Glaeser et al., 2001), leading workers to accept lower 
wages to live and work in more appealing places, so businesses not tied to specific locations for other reasons 
can lower their labor costs by locating in places with positive amenities. Geographic features like coastal 
proximity can also matter (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003); historically, proximity to waterways facilitated trade 
of manufactured goods, though as the U.S. economy has become more service-based this advantage of 
coastal locations (or location next to natural resources) has diminished. Population density can affect growth 
in either direction – enhancing growth through the beneficial effects of the proximity of other businesses, 
workers, and knowledge (“agglomeration economies”), or slowing growth owing to congestion and higher 
land costs.   
4. DATA  
Economic Outcomes 
We focus on growth in employment, total wages, and Gross State Product (GSP). Job growth is at 
the center of policy debate, but policymakers also care about earnings,
9 perhaps in part because higher wages 
generate higher tax revenue and reduce other government expenditures. GSP and wages are related, but GSP 
is broader: it is measured as the sum of wages (equivalently, labor income), capital income (returns to 
business owners, corporations, and other owners of capital), and business taxes. Finally, we measure job 
growth at new businesses, responding to a general and long-standing policy focus on the importance of small 
businesses (which new businesses always are) in job creation (Neumark et al., 2011).   
                                                       
9 A state’s policies might be judged as more successful if they create high-wage jobs. The evidence points to the same 
types of policies increasing employment growth and wage growth (when they have an effect), suggesting that 
employment gains are coming in jobs paying wages that are roughly the same, on average, as the existing stock of jobs.  
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    We use the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to measure overall employment 
growth through 2008. The QCEW also gives a measure of total compensation paid during a calendar quarter 
to covered workers, which we aggregate to measure annual wage growth.
10 The GSP data (in current dollars) 
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GSP is derived as the sum of the GDP originating in all the 
industries in a state. Given that there is a discontinuity in the GSP time series in 1997, with the change from 
SIC to NAICS industry definitions, we use GSP growth for 1997-2008. We use the National Establishment 
Time-Series (NETS) to measure employment growth at new businesses.
11 We had NETS data through 2006. 
Business Climate Indexes  
We collected data on 11 business climate indexes for all available years from 1992 through 2008.
12 
For each of the 11 indexes we use the index values rather than the ranking, which allows us to capture 
information on the magnitudes of the gap between states, which tend to be larger for states nearer to the tails 
of the distributions of the indexes. Because index definitions can change from year to year, we standardize 
each index for each year, subtracting off its mean and dividing by its standard deviation. The indexes are 
signed such that positive values correspond to what is intended to reflect a “better” business climate, based 
on the intention of the creators of each index (e.g., low taxes). In some cases, we used the underlying data to 
construct modified forms of the indexes, described below.  
Business climate sub-indexes  
  Several of the business climate indexes also define and report scores for sub-indexes; these sub-
indexes aggregate up to the “parent” index, so when we substitute the full set of sub-indexes for the 
corresponding index, we do not omit other policies included in the index (although the weighting of specific 
policies is fixed). We discuss the content of these sub-indexes later.   
Control Variables 
                                                       
10 The wage measure includes total compensation paid during the calendar quarter, regardless of when services were 
performed, and includes pay for vacation and other paid leave, bonuses, stock options, tips, the cash value of meals and 
lodging, and in some states, contributions to deferred compensation plans (such as 401(k) plans).  
11 We also estimated the models for employment growth using the NETS, to verify that the results are similar. The 
present paper reports employment results only for the QCEW data. Results with the NETS, and additional information 
on the NETS data, are provided in Kolko et al. (2011).    
12 Our sample period ends in 2008 but the dependent variables for the last year are measured as changes to 2008, so in 
our regressions we use indexes through 2007. However, some of the tables showing descriptive information on the 
indexes refer to the latest year for which an index was available.  
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We included other control variables common in the urban and regional literature, except that we are 
purposely not using as controls other variables that the literature often includes in growth regressions – like 
educational attainment – that are included in business climate indexes (since they reflect policy). Because the 
business-climate indexes span so many different variables, this leaves a relatively small set of additional 
controls, mainly focused on amenities or other geographic or long-standing economic factors that could 
influence economic growth.  
First, we use weather variables from Mendelsohn et al. (1994), capturing both temperature and 
precipitation. These were originally calculated at the county level; we use county-population-weighted state 
averages based on 2006 Census population estimates. We define “Mild” as the negative of the absolute value 
of the difference between monthly average temperature and 20 degrees Celsius, summed over January, April, 
July, and October, and “Dry” as the negative of the average monthly precipitation for those four months, in 
centimeters.
13 Second, we use “Proximity,” defined as the negative of the average distance from the state’s 
county centroids, weighted by county population, to the nearest coast, Great Lake, or major river (Rappaport 
and Sachs, 2003). With the multiplication by −1, higher values of these measures reflect milder weather, 
drier weather, and closer proximity to navigable water. Third, we define population density as the tract-
weighted population density across the state (and use this in natural logarithms), based on 1990 Census data 
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2004).
14  
Finally, we construct a measure of the state-specific “shift-share” or “industry composition effect” 
attributable to the baseline industry mix of the state and national growth by industry, to account for variation 
                                                       
13 We experimented with more flexible specifications of the weather variables. First, to allow more flexible effects of 
weather, we estimated specifications adding quadratic terms in the mild and dry weather variables. Second, to allow 
deviations from mild temperature to be asymmetric in the hot and cold directions, we broke the temperature variable 
into two components: one measuring deviations from 20 degrees Celsius in the summer, and one in the winter. The 
estimated relationships of our growth measures with the business climate indexes for our main specifications (Tables 6 
and 7, discussed below) were very similar.  
14 Even though population density is measured prior to our sample period, it could be endogenously related to 
government policy that evolves slowly over time. One reason to include population density as a control is to capture 
how possible it is for places to grow, and population density seems the best variable to capture this. High-density 
metropolitan areas have higher land prices and lower elasticity of housing supply. Thus, if we tried instead to capture 
limitations on growth in dense places with land prices, the endogeneity bias would be more severe; the lower elasticity 
implies that an outward shift in demand for locations in high-density places will raise price more than quantity relative 
to demand shifts in lower-density places. The relative population density of areas changes much more slowly over time 
and is less likely to reflect these demand shifts. Nonetheless, we have estimated our main specifications (Tables 6 and 7) 




in state economic growth due to the mix of industries in each state. For example, California’s strong 
economic growth during the high-tech boom of the late 1990’s could have occurred because high-tech 
expanded more in California than it did in other states, or California could have exhibited strong economic 
growth during the high-tech boom simply because high-tech grew strongly everywhere, and high-tech was 
originally over-represented in the state. The industry composition effect variable controls for the second type 
of influence, which seems less likely to have anything to do with state policy.  
We start with the industry composition of employment in each state in 1992 (our base year), and 
calculate how employment would have grown had employment in each industry in the state grown at the 
average rate of growth of the industry’s employment in the other 49 states. This calculation is done at the 
level of 3-digit NAICS industries. Letting EIS denote the industry composition effect, E denote employment, 
the subscripts i and j denote states, and the subscript k denote industry, this variable is defined as: 
(1)                                        
             
                             
              
               
       
     . 
Descriptive Information on State Economic Growth and Controls  
Descriptive statistics on the growth and control variables are reported in Table 3. Of perhaps greatest 
interest is employment growth, which averages 1.6 percent annually by state (unweighted). The rates of 
growth of GSP and total wages are higher because they are measured in current dollars (nominal growth is 
removed in the regressions by including year dummy variables). The rate of employment growth due to 
births is also higher, because this measure does not capture employment reductions due to deaths (or 
employment changes due to expansions, contractions, or relocation into or out of states).  
5. WHAT DO THE BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES CAPTURE? 
  The eleven indexes arrive at such contradictory rankings of business climates across states because 
different indexes include or emphasize different factors. Table 4 shows this by grouping our 14 policy 
categories into three broad classes: taxes and costs; productivity (and quality of life); and other. We then 
show the weights that each index puts on the 14 categories as well as the broad class. This table highlights 
sharp differences in the policies that indexes emphasize. For example, the indexes we labeled TXCST1-
TXCST5 (as well as FISCPOL) focus heavily on taxes, costs, and regulation and litigation. The PROD2  
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index emphasizes quality of life and equity measures, and the PROD1 emphasizes human capital, new 
businesses, and technology. More generally, all five of the indexes labeled PROD capture elements of what 
we consider productivity of the workforce or quality of life factors; hence the label. The table reveals 
differences within these groups – such as the sole emphasis of the TXCST1 index on taxes, the emphasis of 
the TXCST4 and TXCST2 indexes on regulation and litigation, and the inclusion of welfare and transfer 
payments in the TXCST4 and TXCST5 indexes.
15  
Table 5 shows the correlations of the indexes, averaged over time, across states. Among the PROD1-
PROD5 indexes, the correlations are positive and generally large. On the other hand, the correlations of these 
five indexes with the next set of five (TXCST1-TXCST5) are mostly negative, and in many cases (especially 
when they are not negative) quite small. Conversely, the correlations among the latter fives indexes are 
uniformly positive, and again quite large. The correlations of the FISCPOL index with the other ten indexes, 
shown in the last row, are generally small and vary in sign, which is why we use a separate label for this 
index. To assess more systematically the impressions given by these correlations, we performed a variety of 
cluster analyses on the average index values, finding that there were two distinct clusters – one that generally 
included the first five indexes listed above, and one that generally included the second set of five indexes. 
The last index (FISCPOL) was more or less randomly assigned to one cluster or the other. 
The correlations and cluster analysis suggest that there are two distinct clusters of indexes. The first 
includes the PROD1, PROD2, PROD3, PROD4, and PROD5 indexes. Tables 1 and 4 showed that these 
indexes reflect productivity of the workforce and other quality of life measures; we hence categorize these 
indexes as belonging to the “productivity” cluster.
16 The second distinct cluster includes the TXCST1, 
TXCST2, TXCST3, TXCST4, and TXCST5 indexes, and based on what these indexes cover, we categorize 
                                                       
15 We also constructed a much more detailed list of the variables within each of our 14 categories that go into each 
index (available from the authors upon request). This, too, is informative for interpreting the indexes. For example, the 
TXCST1 index weighs a broad range of tax rates, while others (the PROD5 and TXCST3 indexes) try to summarize all 
of this information in a single tax burden, and yet others (such as the FISCPOL index) emphasize a small set of taxes. 
Similarly, the list reveals the kinds of variables used to capture quality of life (such as crime rates and infant mortality) 
and equity (such as the poverty rate, and inequality in the income distribution).  
16 From the perspective of urban economics, the predicted effects of factors that affect productivity and factors that 
affect quality of life are different. But these predictions are for wage levels (positive in the first case, and negative in the 
second), not for wage growth or the other dimensions of growth we study. Moreover the spirit of our study is not to 
construct new indexes, but to take them as given. In practice, the indexes do combine these two factors. But the table of 
correlations (Table 5) combined with the table of weights (Table 4) makes clear that even though the “productivity” 
indexes weight different things differently as between quality of life and productivity, the correlations are very high.    
13 
 
this as the “tax-and-cost” cluster.”
17 We did not assign FISCPOL to either cluster.
18 This analysis of the 
content of the indexes, and the identification of two main clusters that underlie most of them, helps explain 
the contradictory state rankings across the various indexes (as well as why we label the first five indexes 
similarly and the next five similarly). Given the broad similarities of how states are ranked within the tax-
and-cost and productivity clusters, but the lack of relationship between how states are ranked across these 
two clusters, we focus on comparing these two clusters in analyzing the relationship between business 
climate indexes and economic growth.   
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES AND STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
METHODS  
We estimate state-level regressions, over time, for growth in four measures: QCEW employment; 
QCEW wages; GSP; and NETS employment due to births. Given that the business climate indexes are 
typically available only for a subset of years (see Table 1), and that there is often not much overlap between 
the years available for different indexes, for the most part we study one index at a time for the years for 
which that index is available. Because inter-temporal correlations of the indexes are generally very high, 
exceeding 0.7 or 0.8 even for observations eight or nine years apart, we would be unlikely to get very 
different answers if we had the index values for other years.   
Our specifications define the index or sub-index at time t, and growth from t to t+1. We also 
explored the sensitivity of the results to varying the length of the interval over which growth is measured, 
and shifting this interval relative to measurement of the business climate index. All specifications include 
year fixed effects to capture the aggregate business cycle, so that we identify the effects of the policies 
captured by state business climate rankings on how state growth differs from the aggregate.  
  It is natural to think about estimating these regression models with state-specific fixed effects, to try 
to identify the effects of changes in the policies captured by a state’s business climate index while avoiding 
                                                       
17 Note that we group “welfare and transfer payments” with taxes and costs even though we treat equity outcomes as 
contributing to quality of life. Net of the income distribution, higher welfare and transfer payments implies more 
redistribution via taxes. The latter implies more deadweight loss from taxation, and more importantly more work 
disincentives, which can clearly lower the level of economic activity. Likely reflecting this argument, Table 4 shows 
that the indexes emphasizing taxes and costs are the ones that put any weight on welfare and transfer payments. 
18 FISCPOL also puts weight on taxes, but with lots of weight on a measure of size of government that makes this index 
quite independent of the other five indexes in the “tax-and-cost” cluster.   
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the confounding influence of time-invariant state characteristics that affect economic growth. However, the 
high inter-temporal correlations within nearly all of the indexes imply that there is little to be learned from 
regression models with fixed state effects.
19 Consequently, our regression models primarily identify the 
effects of variation in the policies captured in business climate indexes and sub-indexes from cross-state 
variation, and rather than including fixed state effects, we incorporate the controls for state characteristics 
likely to affect economic growth that were described earlier. Finally, we report some results with dummy 
variables for the four Census regions.   
Letting ∆Yit denote the growth measures for state i in year t, BCit denote the index, Xi denote the 
control variables, and Dt denote the year fixed effects, we estimate regression models of the form: 
(2)                                                                                    . 
As usual, there are questions of the endogeneity of policy, because policies may be affected by 
economic activity, especially when looking at outcomes and policies at the same jurisdictional level. We do 
not believe there are compelling instrumental variables to solve this problem, though others have tried to 
predict changes in specific policies using political-cycle events like term-end behavior (Besley and Case, 
1995) or determinants of political influence related to an area’s political representatives (Hanson and Rohlin, 
2010). The problem is particularly difficult because BC captures a number (and often a very large number) of 
policies. One could think about using economic development policies in neighboring states, but given the 
possibility of inter-jurisdictional competition (e.g., Brueckner, 2003) the exogeneity of neighboring states’ 
policies is questionable. Thus, we are limited to addressing this issue by carefully controlling for underlying 
trends at the state level, through the industry composition effect variable, and through some other analyses 
specific to particular variables or hypotheses of interest that are discussed later. We also suspect that any 
endogeneity problems are less severe when we study the aggregate business climate indexes, in contrast to 
the narrower sub-indexes; in the former case, the large number and types of policies captured in the indexes 
makes it less likely that state economic growth drives the measured policy variation. 
                                                       
19 Moreover, within-state variation in the indexes over time may reflect a good deal of measurement error, given the 
numerous subjective and somewhat ad hoc decisions that go into constructing the indexes, as well as actual errors in 
measurement. With this type of measurement error, controlling for fixed state effects likely biases the estimated effects 
of the indexes toward zero, and could result in more biased estimates than cross-sectional regressions without fixed 
effects.    
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An ideal analysis of the empirical content of business climate indexes might estimate relationships 
between business climate indexes and economic growth over a long sample period in the past, and then test 
the ability of business climate indexes to forecast economic growth out of sample. However, given the 
relatively short sample period available to us, this is infeasible.  
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES AND STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
RESULTS  
State Economic Growth and Business Climate Indexes 
Tables 6-8 report the estimates of Equation (2) for the different economic growth measures. A set of 
regressions for each business climate index is reported. In each case, we first estimate the model with nothing 
but the business climate index and year fixed effects as independent variables, defining the dependent 
variable as the one-year percentage change. We then augment this model with the controls for the industry 
composition effect, population density, weather, and proximity to navigable water, and then add the Census 
region dummy variables. We also estimated these specifications for annualized percent changes computed 
over two- and three-year periods, to establish that the qualitative findings are robust.
20   
Table 6 reports results for employment growth as measured by the QCEW. In Table 6, for all of the 
productivity indexes, as well as FISCPOL, the estimated relationship between the index and QCEW 
employment growth is either small and not statistically significant, with a central tendency of about zero, or 
anomalously negative and significant (for PROD4). The estimated coefficients of the tax-and-cost indexes 
are all positive, and strongly significant for TXCST1 and TXCST5. The indexes are standardized, so the 
coefficients reflect the estimated effect of a one-standard deviation increase in the index. We also report, in 
square brackets, the change in the growth rate of employment associated with a move in the rankings from 
the 40
th to the 10
th state – a substantial “jump up” in the rankings – based on the average values of the index 
for the included years.    
The strongest and most robust evidence is for the TXCST1 and TXCST5 indexes: we find positive, 
sizable, and statistically significant estimates for every specification we estimated. Taking the estimate from 
                                                       
20 These and many other findings we discuss but do not report in the tables are available in Kolko et al. (2011), or from 
the authors upon request.   
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the second panel of Table 6 of 0.20 for the TXCST5 index implies that moving a state from the 40
th to the 
10
th place in the rankings would increase the rate of growth of employment by 0.36 percentage point – a 
substantial increase compared with the mean employment growth rate of 1.61 percent reported in Table 3.   
The bottom specification reports the estimates when we add the Census region dummy variables 
along with the other controls. In this case, the evidence becomes stronger, with positive and significant 
estimates for all five of the tax-and-cost business climate indexes. (The evidence from these specifications is 
also strong for wage growth, as reported below.) In our view, it is not obvious that we should rely only on the 
evidence from the specifications with Census region dummy variables included. Variation across regions 
may be as important as or more important than variation within regions. For example, evidence on migration 
patterns suggests that states do not compete only with bordering states or states within the same region.
21 
Clearly, though, if the reader believes that the effects are better identified within regions, then more weight 
should be put on these latter specifications, which only strengthen our findings.     
 The table divides the results for the different “clusters” of indexes discussed earlier; to reiterate, the 
first five constitute the productivity cluster, and the next five the tax-and-cost cluster. All of the indexes for 
which there is evidence of a positive relationship between the index and employment growth are in the tax-
and-cost cluster. Conversely, none of the indexes in the productivity cluster has a positive relationship with 
employment growth. Thus, the principal result that emerges is that states with policies that lead them to be 
ranked better on the tax-and-cost-focused indexes – meaning lower taxes, lower regulatory costs, etc. – have 
faster employment growth.  
The results for the control variables are similar for the specification shown in the table and the others 
we estimated but do not report (with, for example, longer windows for estimating growth rates). We refer to 
the specification reported in the second panel as our “baseline” specification. The estimated coefficients of 
the industry composition variable are more or less centered on one. Population density is almost always 
negatively associated with employment growth, and the estimate is generally statistically significant. This 
                                                       
21 For a convenient look at migration flows, see http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/04/migration-moving-wealthy-
interactive-counties-map.html?preload=48453 (viewed February 13, 2012). See also evidence from the ACS reported in 




presumably reflects the higher growth rate associated with a lower base, more room to expand, lower land 
costs, and so on, offsetting any agglomeration effects. The “dry” variable is always estimated to be positively 
associated with employment growth, although the estimate is not statistically significant. In contrast, there is 
a strong positive association between mild weather and employment growth. Somewhat surprisingly, 
perhaps, the estimated effect of proximity to navigable water is negative, and sometimes statistically 
significant. This is not the usual predicted effect from models of economic geography, but may reflect shifts 
in recent decades towards services and low weight-to-value products that have made proximity to water less 
important. (These results for the other controls are very similar for the regressions for the other dependent 
variables, and hence are not reported in the following tables.) 
Table 7 reports estimates for wage and GSP growth. The findings are similar to those for 
employment growth, though somewhat less strong. None of the productivity indexes has a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with either outcome when we include controls. In contrast, with controls 
included the TXCST5 index has a persistent positive and significant estimated effect on these two outcomes. 
Although not reported in the table, as in the employment growth regressions, mild weather, the industry 
composition effect, and lower population density are positively associated with wage and GSP growth. 
 Finally, Table 8 reports results for employment change due to establishment births. In contrast to the 
previous results, the policies captured in the productivity indexes predict employment change due to births at 
least as strongly as the tax-and-cost indexes, when controls are included. Four of five of the productivity 
indexes (PROD1, PROD2, PROD3, and PROD4) have a positive, statistically significant relationship (at the 
10-percent level) with employment change due to births; several of the tax-and-cost indexes do as well, and 
the TXCST4 coefficients are larger than those of the productivity indexes or the other tax-and-cost indexes. 
Nonetheless, we emphasize our results on overall growth in employment, wages, and GSP. It is unclear 
whether greater employment growth due to births in the absence of greater net employment growth is 
advantageous; a larger role for births could lead to higher long-term economic growth if new firms take 
advantage of newer technologies and processes that allow them to generate longer-term growth.
22 However, 
                                                       
22 If the productivity indexes are associated with employment change due to births but not with overall employment 
change, they must also be positively associated with gross job destruction. We confirmed that most of the productivity  
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dividing our years into two time periods and regressing later growth on both earlier and later values of the 
indexes revealed no evidence that the policy variables captured in the productivity indexes are associated 
with future growth. But given that the index rankings are generally quite stable over time, it is hard to 
separate contemporaneous from lagged effects of policies captured in the indexes, and the absence of long 
time-series makes it difficult to test propositions about longer-term growth. 
We carried out several sensitivity tests or additional analyses to assess the validity of the results. 
First, because indexes in the productivity cluster include components that we consider to be outcomes, rather 
than policy factors that affect outcomes, we recalculated these indexes and generate modified indexes 
stripped of outcome components.
23 Our regression results changed little with these modified indexes, which 
is perhaps not surprising since the indexes in the productivity cluster generally showed no positive 
relationships with growth in net employment, wages, or GSP in the first place.  
Second, we repeated the regressions for the tax-and-cost cluster adding a control for the PROD4 
index, the only index from the productivity cluster that generally has a statistically significant (albeit 
negative) relationship with growth in the regression models with the control variables included. Although we 
know from Table 5 that indexes in different clusters have no statistically significant positive correlations, 
some pairs – like TXCST3 and PROD4 – exhibit significant and large negative correlations, raising the 
possibility that we are misattributing the effects of the policies in an index to those in another cluster when 
we include each index singly in Tables 6-8. The tax-and-cost cluster index coefficients changed very little 
when the PROD4 index was included as a control.  
Third, we re-ran our baseline models with some additional controls from just prior to the sample 
period – the share of the population with a high-school degree or more (from the 1990 Census), the share of 
the state’s U.S. House delegation in 1991 that was Democratic, and the Democratic share of the presidential 
vote in the state in 1992. The first captures baseline skill or education differences, and the latter two capture 
political ideology that may shape policy. We did not include these controls in our core models because they 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
indexes are positively associated with components of gross job creation and gross job destruction, which could imply 
that the productivity indexes are associated with the “creative destruction” emphasized by Schumpeter (1942). 
23 Examples are: the employment growth measures, unemployment rate, involuntary part-time employment, and pay 
measures in the PROD2 index; and initial public offerings and “gazelle” jobs in the PROD1 index. We were able to 
generate the PROD1 and the three DRCS indexes (PROD2-PROD4) omitting the outcome components.  
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may to some extent reflect policy, and hence over-control for the policies captured in the business climate 
indexes. Nonetheless, the results were robust to the inclusion of these controls. Interestingly, as well, the 
Democratic vote share was consistently associated with lower growth of all of our measures, and the 
relationship was nearly always statistically significant for employment and GSP growth.   
Fourth, we re-ran our baseline models including state fixed effects. As expected from the high 
correlation of business climate indexes for states over time, standard errors increased considerably, and 
almost no coefficients of the indexes were statistically significant. More specifically, for the tax-and-cost 
indexes, the coefficient estimates were often little changed, but the standard errors were so much larger that 
these estimated coefficients were no longer statistically significant. We therefore interpret these fixed-effects 
results as providing no additional insight while at the same time not contradicting our main results. 
Fifth, as noted earlier, it is possible that industry mix is partly a function of policy, given the 
persistence over time of the business climate indexes. If so, it is possible that we are over-controlling for 
policy by including the industry composition control. We therefore estimated the baseline specification 
omitting the industry control. The estimates were largely unchanged. There was, though, a hint of evidence 
consistent with the over-controlling concern, as the estimated relationships between some of the tax-and-cost 
indexes and employment growth in a couple of instances (wage and GSP growth, for the TXCST2 index) 
became stronger positive and statistically significant. However, the qualitative conclusions are the same, and 
it is not clear that one wants to give credit to the policies captured in the business climate indexes if industry 
composition is actually driving things exogenously.  
Sixth, a potential concern is that the tax-and-cost indexes do not isolate the effects of taxes, because 
the specifications with these indexes may not adequately control for expenditures. This concern is not 
strongly justified, for a number of reasons. First, some of the tax-and-cost indexes have information on 
government expenditures; this is discussed in more detail below with respect to the TXCST4 and TXCST5 
indexes. Second, as we also discuss below, it appears to be tax complexity (especially with regard to 
corporate taxes) that matters, rather than the level of marginal rates, yet there is no reason to expect 
complexity to be correlated with expenditures. Nonetheless, given that the PROD2 and PROD3 indexes 
include some categories related to government expenditures, we re-estimated the models for the tax-and-cost  
20 
 
indexes including these other two indexes as controls. The estimates are often not directly comparable to 
what is reported in Tables 6-8, because the PROD2 and PROD3 indexes are not always available for the 
same years. Nonetheless, the estimates were generally unchanged qualitatively. For the TXCST1 regressions, 
these two productivity indexes are available for the same years, and the estimates were virtually unchanged.  
Seventh, one concern in interpreting the evidence relating the policies captured in the tax-and-cost 
indexes to growth is that the causality could go the other way, with growth leading to lower taxes 
subsequently (and hence a higher ranking). To assess this, we estimated regressions asking whether the 
policies captured by the indexes respond to earlier growth. For each index, we divided the years available (as 
closely as possible into half) into “early” and “late” years. We then estimated regressions of the average 
values of the index for the late years, in each state, on the average values for the early years, and QCEW 
employment growth (annualized) over those same early years. If the policies captured by the indexes are 
endogenous, we might expect positive coefficients on early growth for the indexes, with earlier growth 
leading to lower taxes in the future. There was, in fact, no clear pattern in the data, with positive and negative 
estimates for the tax-and-cost indexes; there were three positive and two negative estimates, and of these, one 
of the positive and one of the negative estimates were significant. Therefore, there is no indication that high 
rankings on the tax-and-cost indexes are explained by earlier strong growth – the endogeneity story of most 
concern in interpreting our results.   
Finally, one might be interested in growth in per capita wages or GSP, rather than growth in levels. 
In our view – which guided our analysis – policymakers focus on growth per se. Consider the emphasis in 
the media and national policy discussion on GDP growth, and the broader concerns of increasing versus 
decreasing population or sizes of economies (across countries). Nonetheless, we also estimated these per 
capita growth regressions. The results are consistent with what one would expect from the results reported 
above, when changes in employment are driven principally by changes in population, rather than changes in 
employment-to-population ratios. Specifically, the taxes-and-cost indexes have roughly equal relationships 
with employment growth on the one hand, and wage growth and GSP growth, on the other, and hence 
essentially no predicted relationship with growth in per capita wages or per capita GSP. In addition, because 
the policies captured by the productivity indexes are either not associated with wage and GSP growth or  
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negatively associated, and are not associated with employment growth, we get negative associations with per 
capita wage and GSP growth. Thus, nothing in these results points to any more evidence of positive effects 
of the policies captured in the productivity indexes, and the evidence indicates that the policies captured by 
the tax-and-cost indexes predict growth in the size of economies, rather than per capita output or wages.
24   
We explored two possibilities for heterogeneous effects. First, we added an interaction between the 
business climate index and the national value for the dependent variable to our baseline regressions with 
controls in Tables 6-8. We also split our sample based on years when national GDP growth was above or 
below median annual national growth for the sample period and repeated our baseline regressions for each 
sub-period. The relationship between the policies captured by the business climate indexes and economic 
growth did not vary with national economic growth. Second, we explored whether the relationship between 
the business climate indexes and economic growth was similar in states with a good deal of economic 
activity near a state border, like New Hampshire or Maryland, and in states with most economic activity far 
from state borders, like California or Texas. To do this, we included an interaction between the share of 
workers that commute daily across state lines in either direction (based on 1990 Census data) and the 
business climate index (as well as the main effect of this cross-commuting measure) in our baseline 
regressions with controls in Tables 6-8. There was no evidence that state economic growth is more sensitive 
to the business climate in states where many businesses are near another state’s border. 
Our last extension was to look at whether economic growth in more “footloose” industries – based 
on industry differences in rates of gross job creation and destruction due to relocation (Kolko and Neumark, 
2007) – is more sensitive to differences in state business climates. Industries that serve a national or 
international market should be more geographically mobile than those tied to local markets (such as services 
delivered in person, like haircuts, or retailers) or dependent on local natural resources or features (like 
mining, forestry, or shipping). The most footloose sectors are manufacturing (NAICS 31-33), information 
(51), finance and insurance (52), and professional and technical services (54). We re-estimate the regression 
                                                       
24 Results from estimates of wage premia at the state level, following Albouy (2009), parallel this conclusion. These 
premia are negatively correlated with the tax-and-cost indexes, and positively correlated with the productivity indexes. 
Given that the tax-and-cost indexes are positively associated with economic growth, and assuming that production 
amenities dominate wage premia, the implication is that factors that affect productivity levels (raising wages) differ 




models for manufacturing only and for information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical 
services together. We look separately at manufacturing because, unlike the other three sectors, it has long had 
a declining share of employment, has traditionally provided reasonably high-paying jobs for middle-class 
workers, and is often the target of specific tax credits and economic development efforts. We look at private 
sector employment and wages in these industries, from the QCEW.  
The results are reported in Table 9. For both employment and wages, the relationship between 
business climate indexes in the tax-and-cost cluster and growth is stronger for manufacturing than for overall 
employment. The top panel of Table 9 shows that the estimated coefficients on three indexes – TXCST1, 
TXCST2, and TXCST3 – are at least twice as large for manufacturing (second row) as for overall private-
sector employment (first row), and the TXCST2 and TXCST3 coefficients become statistically significant 
for manufacturing. Comparing overall private-sector employment with the three footloose non-
manufacturing sectors (third row), no clear pattern emerges: coefficient magnitudes are similar, and two of 
the five indexes are statistically significant for footloose employment and overall private sector employment, 
compared with four for manufacturing employment. The results for wage growth in the bottom panel of 
Table 9 are broadly similar. Finally, looking at the estimated effect of the policies captured by the 
productivity indexes on these same sectors, there is still no consistent relationship with economic growth, 
with the exception of PROD1. The stronger predictive power that PROD1 has for QCEW employment and, 
even more so, for wages may be due to the overlap between PROD1’s heavy emphasis on indicators relevant 
for technology and related industries and our definition of “footloose industries,” which includes the 
information sector and other technology industries. These PROD1 results highlight that business climate 
measures geared toward specific industries may predict growth in those industries better than they predict 
growth for the economy overall. 
The Business Climate versus Other Factors 
The previous results showed that the policies captured in the tax-and-cost indexes have positive 
relationships with economic growth, though factors beyond policy also contribute strongly (as reported in 
Table 6). To compare the estimated contributions to state economic growth of the policy and non-policy 
factors, for each index we calculate the estimated contribution of the business climate index to QCEW  
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employment growth,              , and the estimated total contribution of the five non-policy factors to 
employment growth,            , where     and     are the estimates from Table 6; i indexes states. We average 
these estimates over the models for the three indexes with fairly consistent relationships with economic 
growth (TXCST1, TXCST4, and TXCST5), yielding two measures for each state: the estimated contribution 
of the business climate to employment growth; and the estimated contribution of the five non-policy factors.  
Figure 1, which plots the estimates, shows that there is less variation in employment growth 
associated with the business climate indexes than with the other factors. The implication is that the business 
climate (as captured by the indexes) helps determine economic growth, but it is not as important as the 
combined effect of the other factors, although it is most amenable to policy change.  
The figure also highlights differences across groups of states regarding the business climate and non-
policy factors. Mountain states like New Mexico, Nevada, and Arizona have the most favorable set of non-
policy factors; this region tends to have milder, drier weather, and lower population density. Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, and Indiana have the least favorable set of non-policy factors. The business climate makes the 
most negative estimated contribution to employment growth in New York, California, and Rhode Island. In 
contrast, the business climate makes the most positive contribution in Nevada, Wyoming, and South Dakota, 
and in two of these three states the other factors are also advantageous.  
Many states have both a favorable business climate and favorable non-policy factors, such as 
Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, and Texas, while other states are unfavorable on both dimensions, 
like New York, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. For both sets of states, ignoring non-policy factors could lead 
to giving the business climate undue credit (or blame) for high (or low) employment growth since the non-
policy factors contribute to employment growth in the same direction as the business climate does. In a few 
states, the business climate and non-policy factors have offsetting estimated effects on employment growth. 
Although harder to see in the figure, Indiana, Tennessee, and several other mostly southern states have 
favorable business climates yet unfavorable non-policy factors. A more striking outlier is California, which 
has one of the least favorable business climates, but is in the top tier of states based on non-policy factors. 
8. BUSINESS CLIMATE SUB-INDEXES: WHICH TAXES AND COSTS MATTER? 
To dig beneath the indexes while still avoiding the insurmountable problem of using individual  
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policy variables, we use sub-indexes that exist for three of the tax-and-cost indexes – TXCST1, TXCST4, 
and TXCST5.
25 These sub-indexes are explained in Table 10. Fortunately, this list includes the two indexes 
with the strongest positive relationship with economic growth (TXCST1 and TXCST5). Each of TXCST1’s 
sub-indexes focuses on a particular type of taxation, while the sub-indexes of TXCST4 and TXCST5 also 
cover the level and composition of government spending, regulatory and judicial factors, and other costs of 
doing business. Because the sub-indexes capture narrower, more clearly defined sets of policies than the 
overall indexes, the relationship with economic growth may be stronger for some individual sub-indexes than 
for the parent indexes. 
The TXCST5 and TXCST4 sub-indexes require some deciphering with respect to measuring size of 
government versus welfare and transfer payments. Only one of the three variables in TXCST5’s size of 
government sub-index – “general consumption expenditures by government as percentage of GDP” – falls 
under what we classify as size of government. The other two variables in the TXCST5 size of government 
sub-index – transfers and subsidies as a percent of GDP, and social security payments as a percent of GDP – 
fall into our “welfare and transfer payments” category. Thus, the TXCST5 size of government sub-index, 
despite its name, consists mostly of measures reflecting the extent of spending on welfare, social security,
26 
and transfer payments, and hence is most similar to TXCST4’s welfare spending sub-index; both consist 
primarily of components in the welfare and transfer payments category.  
The TXCST1 corporate tax sub-index also requires clarification. It is comprised of two groups of 
variables. The first group includes measures of the corporate tax rate structure, which includes the top 
marginal tax rate but also the number of tax brackets and their threshold levels; a lower top rate and a flatter 
rate structure contribute to a better sub-index score. The second group includes measures of the corporate tax 
base; more generous net-operating-loss deductions and fewer corporate tax credits are two of the measures 
                                                       
25 We focus only on the tax-and-cost cluster in our analysis of sub-indexes, based on the previous evidence that only the 
indexes in this cluster predict economic growth. We were also able to examine evidence for sub-indexes that were 
available on a consistent basis over time for four of the productivity indexes (PROD1-PROD4). Paralleling the results 
for the “parent” indexes, none of the sub-indexes within the productivity cluster had a consistent, significant positive 
relationship with economic growth. 
26 This is not the usual meaning of “social security,” but instead refers more generally to unemployment insurance, 
disability insurance, workers compensation, and public pensions, defined at the state level. We believe the specific data 
item to which this refers is the state government “Insurance Trust Expenditure” category in the Census Bureau’s 
government finance statistics (http://www.census.gov/govs/www/06classificationmanual/chapter05.html#p2c534, 
viewed July 19, 2010).      
25 
 
that contribute to a better sub-index score. Net-operating-loss deductions, in effect, tax firms on their average 
profitability over time, which the TXCST1 index considers desirable. Tax credits complicate the tax system 
and narrow the tax base, which the TXCST1 index considers undesirable.  
Estimates of the same regressions as before, but substituting the sub-indexes for the corresponding 
parent index, are reported in Table 11. We present results for the baseline specification; results were similar 
for the other variants of the specifications in Tables 6-8. Among the five sub-indexes of TXCST1, the 
corporate income tax sub-index has a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 5-percent level 
with both wage growth and GSP growth.
27 We explored whether this apparent effect of corporate taxes stems 
from variation in marginal rates or other aspects of the tax code, by replacing the corporate tax sub-index 
with the top marginal rate. The latter variable had no statistically significant relationship with any of our 
economic growth measures. Moreover, when we included both the top marginal corporate tax rate and the 
corporate tax sub-index in the model, the tax rate had no relationship with any growth outcome, and the 
estimated coefficient of the corporate tax sub-index remained of similar magnitude and significance. Thus, 
the positive relationship we observe between the sub-index and growth does not appear to be driven by the 
top marginal tax rate, but rather by other factors such as the simplicity of corporate taxation and its 
uniformity with federal taxation.   
Among the TXCST5 sub-indexes, the size of government sub-index stands out as having a positive 
and significant relationship at the 1-percent level with employment and wage growth. And among the 
TXCST4 sub-indexes, one – welfare spending – stands out; this sub-index has a statistically significant 
relationship at the 10-percent level or less with all growth measures except wage growth, and the largest 
coefficient estimate among the TXCST4 sub-indexes for all growth measures.
28 Note that the TXCST4 and 
                                                       
27 We subjected the TXCST1 sub-indexes to an additional robustness test. Because TXCST1 only includes components 
for tax rates and tax burdens, the TXCST1 sub-index model tells us about tax base composition, which could be 
correlated with expenditure composition and therefore subject to omitted variable bias since the TXCST5 and TXCST4 
results (discussed later) suggest that expenditure composition matter for economic growth. We re-ran the model with all 
TXCST1 sub-indexes (Table 11) and added the TXCST5 size of government sub-index (which is available for many of 
the same years); this resulted in little or no change in the coefficient estimates or significance on the TXCST1 corporate 
tax sub-index. 
28 As a sensitivity check for the tax-and-cost sub-index results, we re-estimated these specifications including 
(separately) each of the five productivity indexes, for years for which the productivity index was also available. This 
analysis allows for the possibility that the productivity index is an omitted variable correlated with tax-and-cost sub-
indexes and an economic growth measure. For only one combination of a sub-index (the TXCST4 welfare spending  
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TXCST5 sub-indexes that stand out comprise similar policy measures; TXCST5’s size of government sub-
index and TXCST4’s welfare spending sub-index both consist primarily of variables describing government 
expenditures on welfare and transfer payments. Because the TXCST5 and TXCST4 indexes have sub-
indexes covering many types of taxes and other costs businesses face – including regulation, policies 
affecting labor costs, and more – our finding that the composition of government expenditure matters for 
economic growth is based on an analysis that controls for a wide range of other taxes and costs. These sub-
index results are, in general, stronger and more robust than the results for the business climate indexes 
overall. 
The sub-index analysis yields two main conclusions. First, among taxes, the corporate income tax 
structure and base matter for wage and GSP growth, though not necessarily for employment growth. Only 
the TXCST1 index has sub-indexes that distinguish different tax streams, so this finding comes entirely from 
that one index. Second, greater government expenditure on welfare and transfer payments is associated with 
slower economic growth. The strength of this second conclusion is reinforced by its consistency across two 
different business climate indexes, covering different years and different sub-indexes that serve as controls in 
our model. Admittedly, the TXCST5 size of government sub-index contains more than conventional welfare 
and transfer spending. But the TXCST4 welfare spending sub-index focuses only on the latter, and the results 
for the TXCST4 welfare spending sub-index are qualitatively similar (and in some ways stronger, and in 
particular predictive of GSP growth) than the results for the TXCST5 size of government sub-index.  
At the same time, there are some reasons for caution regarding the findings for welfare and transfer 
payments. One is that there may be reverse causality, with welfare and transfer payments rising when 
economic growth is slower (as more people become eligible for payments or for higher payments). Because 
the TXCST5 size of government sub-index defines these payments as a share of GSP (rather than relative to 
population, as in the TXCST4 welfare spending sub-index), the possibility of this type of bias is even 
stronger for this sub-index, as slow GSP growth can also feed directly into a higher share of payments 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
sub-index) and a productivity index (PROD1) does the inclusion of the productivity index change the positive 
relationship between the sub-index and outcomes; and this combination is for a single year of data since TXCST4 and 
PROD1 were simultaneously available only in 1999.  
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relative to GSP. This suggests that if there is reverse causality, we should find a stronger positive relationship 
with the welfare and transfer payment sub-index (a high value of the sub-index implies low payments) and 
economic growth for the TXCST5 size of government sub-index, and in particular for the GSP growth results 
for that sub-index. It turns out that we can rule out this “mechanical” type of endogeneity bias stemming 
from the inclusion of GSP in the denominator of the TXCST5 size of government sub-index. First, we also 
find significant estimated effects in this direction for the TXCST4 welfare spending sub-index. Most 
important, perhaps, we find a significant relationship between GSP growth and the TXCST4 welfare 
spending sub-index but not the TXCST5 size of government sub-index, the opposite prediction from what we 
would expect if reverse causality from defining payments as a share of GSP were driving the results.  
Another reason to be less concerned about reverse causality is that we use across-state rather than 
within-state variation to identify the effects of the policies captured by the business climate indexes. 
Endogeneity bias is likely reduced by avoiding reliance on short-term changes in state economic conditions 
that could affect some of the policy variables. Indeed, when we simply ran regressions paralleling those in 
Table 11 using the state averages (i.e., the between regression), the results were similar, although sometimes 
a little weaker.  
A second reason for caution about the findings for welfare and transfer payments is that the TXCST5 
size of government sub-index includes a broader set of expenditures, including state retirement pensions. The 
sub-index could therefore be high when a state has a large retirement population (for example, Florida), and 
this could be associated with lower economic growth, but not because these payments change behavior and  
lower growth. However, this concern is assuaged by the fact that the results are similar for the TXCST4 
welfare spending sub-index, which includes only state expenditures focused much more sharply on the 
“welfare” population. In addition, the large retiree population in a state like Florida consists of many 
migrants from other states, so the retirees would not likely be a source of high state retirement pension 
expenditures.  
Overall, these considerations make us more confident – but not definitive – in interpreting the 
combined evidence as identifying the effects of welfare and transfer spending on economic growth. At a 
minimum, however, the evidence from the tax-and-cost-related business climate indexes implies that  
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concerns that high taxes and costs of doing business slow state economic growth need to be taken seriously. 
And this applies particularly to corporate taxation and welfare and transfer payments, identified by the 
analysis of the tax-and-cost sub-indexes as the potentially most important policies related to taxes and costs 
of doing business. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Business climate indexes that emphasize taxes and costs predict economic growth, especially for the 
manufacturing sector. Indexes that focus on productivity measures do not predict growth in employment, 
wages, or GSP – only in births. Although factors beyond the control of state policy, such as the industry mix 
and weather, generally have a stronger relationship with economic growth than do the tax-and-cost policies 
captured by business climate indexes, tax-and-cost-related policies are more amenable to change.  
The tax-and-cost indexes span many policy areas. Looking at the sub-indexes of three business 
climate indexes focused on taxes and costs identified a subset of individual sub-indexes that predict many 
economic growth measures better than their parent indexes do. For one tax-and-cost index (TXCST1), the 
sub-indexes cover different types of taxes, and only the corporate income tax sub-index predicts higher 
growth. Corporate tax features other than the top marginal rate are responsible for this sub-index’s positive 
relationship with economic growth. This evidence is plausible from an economic perspective, as factors that 
contribute to a worse ranking on the corporate tax sub-index – like a plethora of corporate tax credits, and 
greater complexity of the tax structure more generally – increase costs of compliance and create economic 
distortions that could impede growth.   
The sub-indexes of two of the other tax-and-cost indexes (TXCST5 and TXCST4) span more areas 
of taxes and costs. The sub-indexes that focus on taxation had no significant relationship with economic 
growth. However, two sub-indexes focused on welfare and transfer payments exhibit a robust relationship 
indicating that lower welfare and transfer payments are associated with faster economic growth. Why might 
lower welfare and transfer payments contribute to higher economic growth? Any program whose benefits or 
eligibility depends on low income or non-employment status provides some disincentive to work or to work 
less if employed. Welfare reforms attempted to encourage work in a number of ways, including job search 
requirements, limited years of eligibility, and less steep reductions in welfare payments with increases in  
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earnings. Despite these changes, welfare-type programs and transfer payments – by their nature – still tend to 
create work disincentives (just not as strong as they were in the past).  
It is important to emphasize that our analysis focuses on economic growth. Other policies that could 
adversely affect economic growth – including welfare and transfer payments – might contribute to other 
goals like equity. Nonetheless, over the longer run strong economic growth is a prerequisite for generating 
the economic resources needed to pursue goals other than growth. In that sense, our findings confirm and 
emphasize the equity-efficiency tradeoff with respect to state-level public policy and economic growth. 
Finally, in addition to asking what the business climate indexes tell us about policy, we have also 
learned something about the potential value of these business climate indexes in policy debate. We noted that 
the organizations that create these indexes often have political agendas, and that the indexes are used 
selectively in policy debate. Our results indicate that the indexes capturing taxes and other costs of doing 
business seem to capture something meaningful about state business climates, insofar as the outcome of 
interest is economic growth, whereas those capturing elements of productivity and quality of life do not. Of 
course we have not attempted to construct our own index. It is possible that the productivity indexes contain 
a more heterogeneous set of factors, and this obscures underlying relationships between economic growth 
and some of the policies they capture. However, that argument is at least partially undermined by the failure 
to find sub-indexes of the productivity indexes that predict economic growth. An alternative, which we 
cannot rule out based on our analysis, is that the policies underlying the productivity indexes contribute to 
other desirable features of state economies – or states more generally – that are not related to economic 
growth. More evidence along these lines might provide a better rationale for the importance of the 
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TABLE 1: Business Climate Indexes
a 
Index, institution, and years
  Stated focus of index  Policy categories 
PROD1: State New Economy Index, 
Progressive Policy Institute (1999, 
2002) , Information, Technology and 
Innovation Foundation and Kauffman 
Foundation (2007, 2008) 
Compatibility of state’s economy 
with “New Economy”  
Business incubation; human capital; 
technology, knowledge jobs, and digital 
economy, and external sector  
PROD2: Development Report Card for the 
States─Performance, Corporation for 
Enterprise Development (2000-2007) 
Opportunities for employment, 
income, and improving quality of 
life  
Quality of life; equity; employment, earnings, 
job quality, and resource 
efficiency/environment 
PROD3: Development Report Card for the 
States─Development Capacity, 
Corporation for Enterprise 
Development (2000-2007)
   
Capacity for future development   Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); quality of 
life; business incubation; human capital; 
infrastructure; technology, knowledge jobs, and 
digital economy, and resource efficiency/ 
environment 
PROD4: Development Report Card for the 
States─Business Vitality, 
Corporation for Enterprise 
Development (2000-2007)
  
Dynamism of the state’s large and 
small businesses 
Business incubation; technology, knowledge 
jobs, and digital economy, and external sector 
PROD5: State Competitiveness Index, 
Beacon Hill Institute (2001-2008) 
Long-term competitiveness for 
attracting and incubating new 
businesses and growth of existing 
firms  
Cost of doing business; size of government; tax 
rates and burden; quality of life; welfare and 
transfer payments; employment, earnings, and 
job quality; business incubation; human capital; 
infrastructure; technology, knowledge jobs, and 
digital economy, resource 
efficiency/environment, and external sector 
TXCST1: State Business Tax Climate 
Index, Tax Foundation (2003-2009) 
Tax rates  Tax rates and tax burden 
TXCST2: Small Business Survival Index, 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship 
Council (1996-2008) 
Government-imposed or 
government-related costs affecting 
investment, entrepreneurship, and 
business  
Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); size of 
government; tax rates and tax burden; 
regulation and litigation; quality of life; 
infrastructure 
TXCST3: Cost of Doing Business Index, 
Milken Institute (2002-2007) 
Fundamental business costs, 
including labor, taxes, real estate, 
and electricity 
Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); tax rates 
and tax burden 
TXCST4: Economic Freedom Index, 
Pacific Research Institute (1999, 
2004, 2008) 
Government favors free enterprise 
and consumer choice; individual 
rights to pursue interests through 
voluntary exchange of private 
property under rule of law 
Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); size of 
government; tax rates and tax burden; 
regulation and litigation; welfare and transfer 
payments  
TXCST5: Economic Freedom Index of 
North America, The Fraser Institute / 
National Center for Policy Analysis 
(1992-2005) 
Restrictions on economic freedom 
imposed by governments: takings 
and discriminatory taxation; size of 
government; and labor market 
freedom 
Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); size of 
government; tax rates and tax burden; welfare 
and transfer payments  
FISCPOL: Fiscal Policy Report Card on 
the Nation’s Governors, Cato 
Institute (1992-2008, biennial) 
Fiscal performance of governors in 
terms of restraining the growth of 
taxes and spending  
Cost of doing business (excl. taxes); size of 
government; tax rates and tax burden  
a For the PROD1 index, the author of all four reports is the same (Robert Atkinson). The PROD2, PROD3, and PROD4 indexes go back earlier, but only the information 
beginning in 2000 was available on-line. The second column lists the focus of the index as stated by the creating institution. The third column gives our (more objective) 
categorization, although they are often the same as those used by the institutions that create the indexes.  
Sources (for latest version of each index): 
PROD1: http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/2008_state_new_economy_index_120908.pdf (viewed November, 2008); PROD2, PROD3, PROD4: 
http://www.cfed.org/focus.m?parentid=2&siteid=2346&id=2346 (viewed November, 2008); PROD5: http://www.beaconhill.org/compete08/BHIState08-FINAL.pdf 
(viewed November, 2008); TXCST1: http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp58.pdf (viewed November, 2008); TXCST2: 
http://www.sbecouncil.org/uploads/sbsi%202008%5B1%5D1.pdf (viewed December, 2008); TXCST3: http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/2007CostofDoingBusiness.pdf 
(viewed November, 2008); TXCST4: http://special.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/entrep/2008/Economic_Freedom/map.html (viewed November, 2008); TXCST5: 
http://www.freetheworld.com/efna2008/EFNA_complete_Publication.pdf (viewed November, 2008); FISCPOL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-624.pdf (viewed 
November, 2008). 















Alabama  38.4  14.2  32  9  45 
Alaska  34.3  28.9    3  46 
Arizona  30.1  20.6  27  7  37 
Arkansas  42  23.2  27  11  48 
California  15.3  45.6  31  4  47 
Colorado  6.4  13.5  14  1  26 
Connecticut  8.9  38.4  21  5  47 
Delaware  10.4  18.3  35  2  42 
Florida  28.9  14.6  16  5  33 
Georgia  25.6  19.1  17  11  32 
Hawaii  39.3  38.9  25  23  49 
Idaho  22.4  20.4  26  2  34 
Illinois  23.3  27.6  30  10  37 
Indiana  31.9  14.9  17  11  36 
Iowa  26.2  27.2  30  5  44 
Kansas  23.6  22.2  27  7  35 
Kentucky  37.5  27.9  19  15  43 
Louisiana  45.5  26.1  34  14  50 
Maine  28  39.1  25  14  47 
Maryland  12.7  29.1  30  5  38 
Massachusetts  4.4  35  11  1  48 
Michigan  25.2  29.4  16  12  40 
Minnesota  6.7  40.6  19  1  46 
Mississippi  47.8  16.4  17  10  50 
Missouri  29  15.8  27  13  34 
Montana  33.4  22.7  29  4  43 
Nebraska  23.5  25.1  20  10  44 
Nevada  32.4  13.3  20  2  42 
New Hampshire  11.9  13.1  18  1  33 
New Jersey  15.6  43.3  28  5  48 
New Mexico  36.8  34.5  13  13  46 
New York  21.6  48.2  12  12  50 
North Carolina  29.5  28.6  31  13  42 
North Dakota  29.9  21.8  25  2  44 
Ohio  28.8  38.2  33  18  47 
Oklahoma  37.6  19.1  20  8  42 
Oregon  17.8  27.7  39  9  40 
Pennsylvania  19.3  30.3  23  10  45 
Rhode Island  23.7  45.7  26  13  49 
South Carolina  34.5  15  13  8  40 
South Dakota  30.1  3.7  11  1  46 
Tennessee  33.1  12.9  23  1  39 
Texas  24.8  12.6  13  5  47 
Utah  11.2  15.5  21  4  26 
Vermont  18.1  39.6  22  3  43 
Virginia  9.8  13.8  26  5  30 
Washington  11.5  26.1  21  3  40 
West Virginia  47.8  33.5  29  14  49 
Wisconsin  20.2  32.6  21  8  38 
Wyoming  28.1  11.2  26  1  46 
a 
We first average each index across years, and then average these averages to get the numbers reported in the first two 
columns. The last two columns report the minimum and maximum of the averages of each individual index. 
  
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics for Growth Measures and Control Variables
a  
Variable  Source  N  Mean 
Std. 
dev.  Min.  Max. 
Growth rates             
Employment  BLS-QCEW  768  1.61  1.71  -3.51  10.17 
Total wages  BLS-QCEW  768  5.26  2.56  -2.63  15.67 
Gross State Product (GSP)  BEA  528  5.07  2.40  -3.21  14.10 
Employment change due to 
births 
NETS  672  5.14  1.78  2.24  13.36 
Controls             
Industry composition  NETS  768  0.98  0.17  0.61  1.41 
Population density (logs)  Census of 
Population 
768  7.74  0.74  6.62  10.22 
Dry  Mendelsohn et 
al. (1994) 
768  -7.54  2.90  -12.09  -1.70 
Mild  Mendelsohn et 
al. (1994) 
768  -40.05  11.25  -62.68  -17.12 
Proximity  Rappaport and 
Sachs (2003) 
768  -189.96  238.36  -959.02  -10.14 
a 
Employment, wages, and GSP growth are one-year percent changes, multiplied by 100. Employment due to births is the 
percentage growth in total employment attributable to births, and equals the change in employment due to births relative to start-
year total employment (multiplied by 100). The births measure exceeds the overall percent change in employment because it is a 
gross job flow. The descriptive statistics in this table cover 1992-2006 for NETS employment change due to births; 1992-2008 for 
QCEW employment and wages; and 1997-2008 for GSP. The control variables are defined as the negatives of measures of 
precipitation, temperature extremes, and distance to water; therefore more positive values imply drier, milder, and closer to water. 
In the regressions in tables that follow, subsets of the observations are used, depending on the years in which an index is available. 
Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the descriptive statistics as well as the regressions that follow because some of the control 
variables are unavailable; however, they are included in the industry composition effect calculation. “Mean” refers to the 
unweighted average of state values for each variable.  
 
  
TABLE 4: Distribution of Weights of Components of Business Climate Indexes (%)
a 
   PROD1  PROD2  PROD3  PROD4  PROD5  TXCST1  TXCST2  TXCST3  TXCST4  TXCST5  FISCPOL 
Taxes and costs category   0.0  0.0  4.0  0.0  20.9  100.0  94.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Cost of doing business 
(excluding taxes) 
    4.0    9.3    8.8  80.0  1.3  22.2   
Size of government           7.0    8.8    14.7  22.2  66.7 
Tax rates and tax burden          2.3  100.0  47.1  20.0  19.2  33.3  33.3 
Regulation and litigation              29.4    40.5     
Welfare and transfer 
payments 
        2.3        24.3  22.2   
Productivity category   90.4  80.0  92.0  75.0  65.1  0.0  5.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Quality of life     20.0  12.0    23.3    2.9         
Equity    20.0                   
Employment, earnings and 
job quality 
  40.0      4.7             
Business incubation  25.1    20.0  52.5  9.3             
Human capital  3.4    20.0    7.0             
Infrastructure      20.0    2.3    2.9         
Technology, knowledge 
jobs, and digital economy 
61.8    20.0  22.5  18.6             
“Other” category   9.6  20.0  4.0  25.0  14.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Resource efficiency / 
environment 
  20.0  4.0    7.0             
External sector  9.6      25.0  7.0             
a 
See notes to Table 1 for more details on the indexes; the categories listed here correspond to the third column of that table. To get the percentages shown, we began with the list of variables in each index and assigned 
to each variable a weight according to each index’s methods. TXCST2 weights each variable equally in the index, and TXCST3 and PROD1 each assigns different weights to each variable in the index. The other 
indexes create sub-indexes: variables are weighted equally in each sub-index, and then the sub-indexes are either weighted equally (PROD2, PROD3, PROD4, PROD5, TXCST5, and FISCPOL) or are assigned 
different weights (TXCST4) in the final index. Even within an index with equally weighted sub-indexes containing equally weighted variables, each variable’s weight in the final index depends on the number of 
variables in its sub-index. All of the TXCST1 variables fall under the “tax rates and tax burden” category, making it unnecessary to replicate the index’s weighting scheme for this table.   
 
  
TABLE 5: Correlations of Average Indexes across States, 1992-2009
a 
   PROD1  PROD2  PROD3  PROD4  PROD5  TXCST1  TXCST2  TXCST3  TXCST4  TXCST5 
PROD1  1                   
PROD2  .56*  1                 
PROD3  .76*  .72*  1               
PROD4  .72*  .30*  .58*  1             
PROD5  .61*  .75*  .77*  .31*  1           
TXCST1  -.12  -.05  -.12  -.24  .18  1         
TXCST2  -.17  -.11  -.13  -.09  .04  .79*  1       
TXCST3  -.65*  -.29*  -.30*  -.37*  -.12  .25  .39*  1     
TXCST4  -.30*  -.01  -.15  -.17  .19  .55*  .54*  .66*  1   
TXCST5  .04  -.01  .03  .26  .10  .41*  .61*  .33*  .60*  1 
FISCPOL  .14  .11  .02  .16  .16  .22  .35*  -.11  .07  .17 
a
 Table reports correlations of the average across years for each index. * indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. All 50 states are included.  
 
   
  
 
TABLE 6: Regressions for Yearly QCEW Employment Growth, 1992-2008
a 






0.08  -0.10  -0.09  -0.28  0.15  0.47  0.23  0.32  0.29  0.29  0.05 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10)***  (0.12)  (0.10)***  (0.11)**  (0.08)***  (0.12)**  (0.10)***  (0.05) 
[0.15]  [-0.18]  [-0.17]  [-0.50]  [0.26]  [0.705]  [0.40]  [0.39]  [0.49]  [0.51]  [0.10] 
R
2  0.49  0.45  0.45  0.48  0.45  0.39  0.54  0.37  0.07  0.54  0.50 
R
2 (regression  
on year 
dummies only) 
0.49  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.28  0.52  0.33  0.01  0.51  0.50 






0.07  -0.01  0.02  -0.20  0.12  0.25  0.12  0.18  0.18  0.20  0.03 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)**  (0.10)  (0.09)***  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.07)***  (0.05) 
[0.12]  [-0.03]  [0.03]  [-0.35]  [0.21]  [0.37]  [0.21]  [0.22]  [0.31]  [0.36]  [0.05] 
Industry 
composition 
1.87  1.73  1.71  1.42  1.46  0.57  1.84  1.57  2.04  2.11  2.13 
(0.41)***  (0.49)***  (0.50)***  (0.47)***  (0.59)**  (0.67)  (0.52)***  (0.68)**  (0.99)**  (0.80)**  (0.70)*** 
  [0.52]  [0.48]  [0.48]  [0.40]  [0.41]  [0.16]  [0.51]  [0.44]  [0.57]  [0.59]  [0.59] 
Population 
density 
-0.25  -0.34  -0.35  -0.18  -0.35  -0.10  -0.20  -0.16  0.04  -0.32  -0.26 
(0.10)**  (0.10)***  (0.11)***  (0.10)*  (0.12)***  (0.14)  (0.10)**  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.12)***  (0.13)** 
  [-0.38]  [-0.52]  [-0.54]  [-0.28]  [-0.54]  [-0.16]  [-0.31]  [-0.24]  [0.07]  [-0.49]  [-0.40] 
Dry  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.13  0.11  0.07 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.08)*  (0.06)*  (0.06) 
  [0.002]  [0.12]  [0.13]  [0.10]  [0.24]  [0.12]  [0.37]  [0.17]  [0.78]  [0.62]  [0.44] 
Mild  -0.003  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.007)*  (0.006)**  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
  [-0.08]  [0.32]  [0.37]  [0.37]  [0.57]  [0.30]  [0.42]  [0.45]  [0.75]  [0.57]  [0.75] 
Proximity  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [-0.27]  [-0.40]  [-0.40]  [-0.42]  [-0.44]  [-0.47]  [-0.27]  [-0.49]  [-0.15]  [-0.21]  [-0.25] 
R






0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.24  0.08  0.23  0.15  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.05 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10)**  (0.09)  (0.08)***  (0.06)**  (0.15)**  (0.15)**  (0.07)***  (0.05) 
[0.04]  [-0.08]  [-0.06]  [-0.44]  [0.14]  [0.34]  [0.27]  [0.38]  [0.54]  [0.54]  [0.10] 
R
2    0.58  0.60  0.60  0.62  0.62  0.50  0.66  0.56  0.50  0.70  0.66 
a 
Business climate indexes are standardized by year. Unit of observation is the state and year. All models include year fixed effects. The additional (“baseline”) controls are added in the second panel, and the Census region 
dummy variables as well in the third panel. Standard errors clustered by state are used for statistical inference, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level. The square brackets show 
the estimated coefficients multiplied by the difference between the 10
th and 40
th state rankings for each variable. Hawaii and Alaska are excluded. Population density is entered in logs.  
DEFINITIONS: PROD1: State New Economy Index; PROD2: Development Report Card for the States—Performance; PROD3: Development Report Card for the States—Development Capacity; PROD4: Development 
Report Card for the States—Business Vitality; PROD5: State Competitiveness Index; TXCST1: State Business Tax Climate index; TXCST2: Small Business Survival Index; TXCST3: Cost of Doing Business Index; 
TXCST4: Economic Freedom Index; TXCST5: Economic Freedom Index of North America; FISCPOL: Fiscal Policy Report Card. 
 
TABLE 7: Regressions for Yearly QCEW Wage Growth 1992-2008, and GSP Growth, 1997-2008
a 
   Controls  PROD1  PROD2  PROD3  PROD4  PROD5  TXCST1  TXCST2  TXCST3  TXCST4  TXCST5  FISCPOL 





0.26  -0.17  -0.25  -0.57  0.09  0.65  0.29  0.34  0.24  0.42  0.09 
(0.14)*  (0.11)*  (0.12)**  (0.16)***  (0.16)  (0.22)***  (0.14)**  (0.13)**  (0.24)  (0.11)***  (0.09) 
[0.49]  [-0.31]  [-0.47]  [-1.03]  [0.16]  [0.96]  [0.51]  [0.43]  [0.41]  [0.74]  [0.20] 
R
2  0.53  0.48  0.48  0.53  0.49  0.37  0.55  0.39  0.18  0.53  0.48 
R
2 (regression  
on year 
dummies only) 
0.52  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.49  0.29  0.54  0.37  0.17  0.50  0.48 






0.26  -0.15  -0.21  -0.47  -0.02  0.28  0.16  0.12  0.19  0.36  0.06 
(0.16)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.14)***  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.08)***  (0.09) 
[0.50]  [-0.28]  [-0.40]  [-0.85]  [-0.04]  [0.41]  [0.29]  [0.15]  [0.33]  [0.63]  [0.13] 
R






0.23  -0.17  -0.24  -0.54  -0.04  0.30  0.21  0.30  0.47  0.49  0.08 
(0.16)  (0.16)  (0.14)*  (0.15)***  (0.13)  (0.17)*  (0.10)**  (0.30)  (0.22)**  (0.07)***  (0.10) 
[0.43]  [-0.33]  [-0.44]  [-0.98]  [-0.08]  [0.44]  [0.38]  [0.37]  [0.81]  [0.86]  [0.16] 
R
2    0.59  0.59  0.59  0.62  0.62  0.48  0.63  0.55  0.56  0.62  0.57 



























    [-0.12]  [-0.50]  [-0.68]  [-1.25]  [0.13]  [1.15]  [0.59]  [0.58]  [0.62]  [0.60]  [0.35] 
R
2    0.11  0.23  0.23  0.29  0.19  0.29  0.19  0.19  0.04  0.19  0.13 
R
2 (regression  
on year 
dummies only) 
  0.11  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.17  0.16  0.02  0.17  0.12 














































-0.17  -0.23  -0.34  -0.59  0.001  0.25  0.21  0.43  0.34  0.30  0.11 
(0.27)  (0.19)  (0.17)**  (0.15)***  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.32)  (0.11)**  (0.14) 
[-0.33]  [-0.44]  [-0.63]  [-1.07]  [0.00]  [0.37]  [0.37]  [0.54]  [0.58]  [0.52]  [0.23] 
R
2    0.28  0.38  0.38  0.41  0.35  0.41  0.29  0.37  0.39  0.31  0.31 
a 
See notes to Table 6. The estimated coefficients of the baseline controls are not reported.  
DEFINITIONS: PROD1: State New Economy Index; PROD2: Development Report Card for the States—Performance; PROD3: Development Report Card for the States—Development Capacity; PROD4: Development 
Report Card for the States—Business Vitality; PROD5: State Competitiveness Index; TXCST1: State Business Tax Climate index; TXCST2: Small Business Survival Index; TXCST3: Cost of Doing Business Index; 
TXCST4: Economic Freedom Index; TXCST5: Economic Freedom Index of North America; FISCPOL: Fiscal Policy Report Card. 
 
 
TABLE 8: Regressions for Employment Growth Due to Births, 1992-2006
a 





0.15  -0.09  -0.04  0.08  -0.02  0.33  0.26  0.05  0.37  0.33  0.02 
(0.10)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.12)***  (0.12)**  (0.07)  (0.11)***  (0.09)***  (0.09) 
[0.29]  [-0.18]  [-0.08]  [0.14]  [-0.04]  [0.47]  [0.47]  [0.06]  [0.63]  [0.58]  [0.05] 
R
2  0.79  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.29  0.32  0.69  0.33  0.62  0.69  0.60 
R
2 (regression  
on year 
dummies only) 
0.78  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.29  0.19  0.67  0.33  0.56  0.65  0.60 














































0.22  0.27  0.15  0.10  0.09  0.15  0.14  -0.04  0.38  0.21  0.02 
(0.08)**  (0.09)***  (0.08)*  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.08)*  (0.10)  (0.13)***  (0.08)***  (0.06) 
[0.41]  [0.52]  [0.29]  [0.18]  [0.16]  [0.21]  [0.26]  [-0.05]  [0.65]  [0.37]  [0.05] 
R
2    0.90  0.58  0.56  0.55  0.61  0.60  0.81  0.68  0.80  0.80  0.75 
a 
See notes to Table 6. The estimated coefficients of the baseline controls are not reported.   
Definitions: PROD1: State New Economy Index; PROD2: Development Report Card for the States—Performance; PROD3: Development Report Card for the States—Development Capacity; PROD4: 
Development Report Card for the States—Business Vitality; PROD5: State Competitiveness Index; TXCST1: State Business Tax Climate index; TXCST2: Small Business Survival Index; TXCST3: Cost of 
Doing Business Index; TXCST4: Economic Freedom Index; TXCST5: Economic Freedom Index of North America; FISCPOL: Fiscal Policy Report Card.  
 
TABLE 9: Regressions for QCEW Employment and Wages in Manufacturing and Footloose Industries, 1992-2008
a  
 
 Industry  PROD1  PROD2  PROD3  PROD4  PROD5  TXCST1  TXCST2  TXCST3  TXCST4  TXCST5  FISCPOL 
A. Employment 
Total private  0.06  -0.05  -0.001  -0.25  0.11  0.26  0.13  0.22  0.17  0.22  0.02 
  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.11)**  (0.11)  (0.10)**  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.08)***  (0.06) 
 
[0.11]  [-0.09]  [-0.00]  [-0.457]  [0.19]  [0.39]  [0.23]  [0.28]  [0.29]  [0.38]  [0.04] 
Manufacturing  -0.29  -0.27  -0.10  -0.56  0.05  0.53  0.33  0.86  -0.09  0.28  0.03 
  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.18)***  (0.23)  (0.21)**  (0.15)**  (0.26)***  (0.36)  (0.15)*  (0.11) 
 
[-0.56]  [-0.51]  [-0.18]  [-1.01]  [0.09]  [0.78]  [0.58]  [1.07]  [-0.15]  [0.49]  [0.07] 
Footloose  0.33  -0.05  0.002  -0.27  0.20  0.24  0.20  0.38  0.05  0.25  0.20 
industries  (0.19)*  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.16)*  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.14)**  (0.46)  (0.12)**  (0.15) 
 
[0.63]  [-0.09]  [0.00]  [-0.49]  [0.34]  [0.35]  [0.34]  [0.47]  [0.08]  [0.44]  [0.41] 
B. Wages 
Total private  0.33  -0.20  -0.25  -0.56  -0.08  0.30  0.19  0.19  0.21  0.40  0.08 
  (0.18)*  (0.19)  (0.15)*  (0.16)***  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.09)***  (0.11) 
 
[0.62]  [-0.38]  [-0.46]  [-1.00]  [-0.13]  [0.45]  [0.33]  [0.23]  [0.36]  [0.70]  [0.16] 
Manufacturing  0.19  -0.22  -0.18  -0.65  0.14  0.69  0.34  0.64  -0.78  0.37  0.23 
 
(0.40)  (0.36)  (0.27)  (0.22)***  (0.26)  (0.26)**  (0.17)*  (0.35)*  (0.70)  (0.16)**  (0.18) 
  [0.36]  [-0.41]  [-0.33]  [-1.17]  [0.25]  [1.02]  [0.59]  [0.80]  [-1.35]  [0.66]  [0.48] 
Footloose  0.81  -0.18  -0.23  -0.39  0.06  0.15  0.19  0.10  0.57  0.47  0.13 
industries  (0.25)***  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.48)  (0.15)***  (0.17) 
 
[1.54]  [-0.33]  [-0.42]  [-0.70]  [0.10]  [0.22]  [0.34]  [0.13]  [0.98]  [0.83]  [0.27] 
N  144  288  288  288  336  192  576  288  96  672  309 
a 
Employment and wages data cover private ownership sector only. The specifications correspond to the second ones (with “baseline controls”) in Tables 6-8. Manufacturing employment corresponds to NAICS codes 
31-33, and footloose industries are information (51), finance and insurance (52), and professional and technical services (54). 
Definitions: PROD1: State New Economy Index; PROD2: Development Report Card for the States—Performance; PROD3: Development Report Card for the States—Development Capacity; PROD4: Development 
Report Card for the States—Business Vitality; PROD5: State Competitiveness Index; TXCST1: State Business Tax Climate index; TXCST2: Small Business Survival Index; TXCST3: Cost of Doing Business Index; 
TXCST4: Economic Freedom Index; TXCST5: Economic Freedom Index of North America; FISCPOL: Fiscal Policy Report Card.  
 
TABLE 10: Business Climate Sub-Indexes, 1992-2007
a 
 
Description / variables included 
Sub-index 
weight 
A. State Business Tax Climate Index (TXCST1) 
Corporate tax sub-index  
 
Tax rate sub-index: corporate income tax top rate; bracket structure; gross receipts rate 
Tax base sub-index: availability of certain credits, deductions and exemptions; ability of taxpayers to 
deduct net operating losses; smaller tax base issues (under gross receipts tax, the three tax base criteria 
are replaced by availability of deductions from gross receipts for employee compensation costs and 
cost of goods sold) 
19.4 
Individual income tax 
sub-index  
 
Tax rate sub-index: top marginal tax rate and graduated rate structure (takes into account starting 
points of top brackets, number of brackets, and average width of brackets) 
Tax base sub-index: marriage penalty; capital gains taxation; double taxation of capital income; minor 
base issues  
29.2 
Sales tax sub-index   Tax rate sub-index: state-level rate and combined state-local rate 
Tax base sub-index: whether base includes variety of business-to-business transactions such as 
agricultural products, services, machinery, computer software, and leased or rented items; whether 
base includes goods and services typically purchased by consumers; excise tax rate on products such 
as gasoline, diesel fuel, tobacco, spirits, and beer 
21.5 
Property tax sub-index   Tax rate sub-index: property tax collection, measured both per capita and as percentage of personal 
income; capital stock tax rates and maximum payments 
Tax base sub-index: whether levies wealth taxes such as inheritance, estate, gift, inventory, and 
intangible property  
15.7 
Unemployment insurance 
tax sub-index  
 
Tax rate sub-index: rates levied in the most recent year; statutory rate schedules that could be 
implemented depending on the state of the economy and the UI fund 
Tax base sub-index: experience rating formulas; charging methods; and smaller factors 
14.2 
B. Economic Freedom Index of North America (TXCST5) 
Size of government sub-
index 
General consumption expenditures by government as a percent of GDP; transfers and subsidies as 
percent of GDP; social security payments (includes unemployment insurance, disability, public 
pensions) as percent of GDP 
33.3 
Labor market freedom 
sub-index 






Total tax revenue as percent of GDP; top marginal income tax rate and income threshold at which 
applies; indirect tax revenue as a percent of GDP; sales taxes collected as a percent of GDP 
33.3 
C. Economic Freedom Index (TXCST4) 
Fiscal sub-index  Average days required for work to cover taxes; per capita state tax revenue; per capita state and local 
property tax revenue; tax burden on high income families; per capita state government death and gift 
tax revenue; per capita state government severance tax revenue; personal income taxes; sales taxes; 
excise taxes; license taxes; corporate taxes; state debt; tax exemptions 
34.9 
Regulatory sub-index  Licensing requirements for non-health professions; licensing requirements for health professions; 
continuing education requirements for selected professions; percent land owned by federal 
government; purchasing regulations; public school regulation; labor legislation; full-time-equivalent 
employees of state public utilities commissions; corporate constituency statutes; property rights 
legislation; strictness of state gun laws; state seat belt laws; state provisions for minimum age for 
driver’s licenses; full-time-equivalent employees of insurance regulation organization; state legislation 




Per capita state and local welfare spending; percent of population receiving public aid; Medicare 
benefit payments per enrollee; per capita Medicaid spending; average monthly Food Stamp benefit per 
recipient; monthly TANF benefit for family of three; average monthly benefit per participant for 
Women, Infants, and Children Special Nutrition Program; commodity costs of National School Lunch 




State and local total expenditures as a percent of GSP; size of government workforce; citizen 
representation (avg. of total number of government units, and legislators per million people) 
6.3 
Judicial  Number of resident active attorneys; Attorney General salary; judges’ compensation; judges’ terms; 
judges’ selection method; state has Illinois Brick Repealer statutes (which restrict anti-trust suits); tort 
reform; medical-liability reform 
-12.6 
a 
State Business Tax Climate sub-index weights described are for 2006 and 2007; sub-index weighting was different for 2003 and 2004. For the Economic Freedom 
Index, sub-index weights described are for 2004; sub-index weighting was different in 1999. Note that variables in some sub-indexes are described relative to state 
GSP, and others relative to GDP; these are interchangeable terms. Small Business Tax Climate sub-indexes are weighted in direct proportion with how much each sub-
index varies across states. The Economic Freedom Index sub-indexes are weighted according to a principal components analysis, and the negative weight on the judicial 
sub-index presumably reflects a weak or negative correlation with other Economic Freedom Index sub-indexes. 
 
TABLE 11: Regressions Including All Sub-Indexes within an Index, 1992-2008
a 
   QCEW 
Employment 
QCEW Total 
Wages  GSP 
Employment change 
due to births 
A. State Business Tax Climate Index (TXCST1) 
Corporate tax  0.21  0.47  0.51  0.07 
sub-index  (0.13)  (0.21)**  (0.23)**  (0.10) 
  [0.22]  [0.49]  [0.53]  [0.08] 
Individual income  0.08  -0.03  -0.09  0.11 
tax sub-index  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.10) 
  [0.10]  [-0.04]  [-0.11]  [0.14] 
Sales tax sub-index  0.01  -0.10  -0.34  0.09 
  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.15)**  (0.07) 
  [0.01]  [-0.09]  [-0.30]  [0.08] 
Property tax sub-index  0.13  0.05  0.34  0.01 
  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.19)*  (0.08) 
  [0.23]  [0.08]  [0.60]  [0.02] 
Unemployment  0.05  0.07  0.13  -0.05 
Insurance tax sub-index  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.08) 
  [0.09]  [0.13]  [0.24]  [-0.09] 
N  192  192  192  96 
R
2  0.50  0.49  0.44  0.59 
Sub-index coefficients equal (p-value)  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.35 
B. Economic Freedom Index of North America (TXCST5) 
Size of  0.36  0.47  0.15  0.22 
government sub-index  (0.12)***  (0.15)***  (0.15)  (0.10)** 
  [0.63]  [0.83]  [0.26]  [0.38] 
Labor market  0.002  0.12  0.22  -0.001 
freedom sub-index  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.10) 
  [0.003]  [0.17]  [0.32]  [-0.00] 
Takings and  -0.13  -0.15  -0.06  -0.06 
discriminatory taxation  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.10) 
sub-index  [-0.22]  [-0.26]  [-0.11]  [-0.10] 
N  672  672  432  672 
R
2  0.68  0.61  0.29  0.79 
Sub-index coefficients equal (p-value)  0.02  0.00  0.15  0.08 
C. Economic Freedom Index (TXCST4) 
Fiscal sub-index  0.07  -0.02  -0.24  -0.08 
  (0.17)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.10) 
  [0.13]  [-0.04]  [-0.42]  [-0.13] 
Regulatory sub-index  -0.16  -0.15  -0.07  0.04 
  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.29)  (0.10) 
  [-0.25]  [-0.23]  [-0.12]  [0.06] 
Welfare spending  0.31  0.37  0.53  0.30 
sub-index  (0.15)**  (0.23)  (0.28)*  (0.14)** 
  [0.46]  [0.54]  [0.79]  [0.44] 
Government size  0.10  0.33  0.10  0.16 
sub-index  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.08)* 
  [0.17]  [0.54]  [0.16]  [0.26] 
Judicial sub-index  -0.11  -0.08  -0.12  0.11 
  (0.11)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.08) 
  [-0.21]  [-0.16]  [-0.23]  [0.21] 
N  96  96  96  96 
R
2  0.43  0.52  0.38  0.78 
Sub-index coefficients equal (p-value)  0.02  0.12  0.40  0.02 
a 
The dependent variable is 1-year changes of the variable in the first column, and all controls are included, so the specifications  
correspond to the second ones in Tables 6-8. The sub-indexes are scaled so that positive values are intended to reflect a “better” business 
climate; e.g., higher values of the sub-indexes correspond to lower taxes or lower welfare and transfer payments. 
 





a Presents product of coefficients from Table 6 and states’ values for business climate index and control variables relative to mean. Units are 
percentage points of annual employment growth. Estimates are averaged over values from TXCST1, TXCST4, and TXCST5 models.  
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